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Abstract 
 
The paper develops and studies a decentralized mechanism for pricing and allocation challenges 
typically met with administrative processes. Traditional forms of markets are not used due to 
conditions associated with market failure, such as complex coordination problems, thin markets, 
non-convexities including and zero marginal cost due to lumpy transportation capacities. The 
mechanism rests on an assignment process that is guided by a computational process, enforces 
rules and channels information feedback to participants.  Special, testbed experimental methods 
produce high levels of efficiency when confronted by individual behaviors that are consistent 
with traditional models of strategic behavior. 
 
SECTION 1: The School Transportation Problem 
  
The research
1
 purpose is to develop and test a “decentralized” market based mechanism and its 
application to an environment with many properties capable of creating market failures.  The 
mechanism and the environment reflect part of a proposal for the transport of children to a school 
specialized for students with severe disabilities.   
The school is dedicated to providing the children with the best possible education. The 
disabilities range from being blind, deaf or aphasic to the severely physically disabled 
(wheelchair confined), mentally challenged or severe behavioral problems (requiring almost 
constant supervision). The disabled children’s homes are scattered around a large urban area. 
Special transportation services are required. Getting the child to school is listed among the most 
difficult challenges that the families face.
2
 The current transportation service, constructed from 
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2 The context of the research can best be understood against the complexity of the transportation problem. The 
school is a magnet school located in Victoria, Australia, that specializes in education for disabled children grades K 
thru 12.  The parents of students often cite transportation to and from school as one of the most difficult problems 
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government-supplied buses, is expensive and involves considerable time required on the buses 
(up to four hours).  The proposal is to replace the governmentally supplied bus system with a 
market based system in which parents would contract for transportation services using grants 
provided by the government. The background question posed for research is whether a market 
based policy that draws on competition within the local transportation industry is feasible and if 
it can do a better job compared to the governmentally supplied bus.  
          The underlying economic environment contains economic conditions well known as 
causes of market failures. Natural models of market mechanisms based on classical institutions 
have no competitive equilibria due to coordination problems, asymmetric information, thin 
markets and zero marginal costs due to non-convexities.  In the absence of an alternative 
mechanism the governmentally supplied bus is the natural alternative. 
          A two sided (smart) bidding mechanism built on principles of matching and stability 
suggests itself as a market based option. Abstract theory (matching with side payments), 
experience with smart markets (combo auctions) and even classical institutions (specialists and 
market makers) suggest a two sided auction-like process as a possible acceptable alternative.  
        The research explores a step toward a field test of a policy option by examining 
environments that contain key major problems even though it does not contain all of the potential 
problems.  Experiments reported here are scaled down and while the supply side is active with 
continuous bidding, the demand side is passive with bids submitted once and remain unchanged 
throughout the auction.  These simplifications allow the study of key features of the mechanism 
before additional complexities are implemented. 
           
SECTION 2. A Testbed Experimental Approach 
 
Testbed methodologies are positioned as steps to a field trial in light of the complexities and 
problems likely encountered. The complexity of the field can far exceed that of any laboratory 
testbed.  A testbed is viewed as a first step in a series of steps to refine and improve the 
mechanism through a process in which theories emerge in the light of experience and goals 
evolve as expectations of the possibilities become modified. The objective of the testbed is to 
identify events that could lead to policy failure and in the light of theory, adjust the mechanism 
to avoid them.   
                                                                                                                                                       
they face. Specifically, the expectation for quicker trips to school, smaller busses, revised pick-up and drop-off 
arrangements and closer assessment of children according to their supervision needs are seen as ways to improve the 
quality of the school travel service. From the school’s perspective, the arrangements are anticipated to reduce stress 
on students (particularly younger students) resulting in learning and behavior gains at school.  The physical arrival 
and departure arrangements as well as staff arrangements needed for the pilot have been developed at the school.  
Furthermore, a process to assess student travel needs, behavior assessments and travel preferences has been 
developed and is ready to implement. 
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2.1 Testbeds and Theory. 
The testbed experiments are exploratory by nature and are used where other methodologies have 
limitations.  A theory testing approach is sometimes not realistic because a complete, well 
developed and precisely defined theory might not exist. Similarly,  measurement methods where 
the experiment is designed to produce a measurement of some parameter, need not be 
appropriate. Examples of measurement methods include experiments designed to measure 
beliefs, willingness to pay of some select group of people or elasticity of a demand or a supply 
for a commodity, none of which are central to the research reported here.  An exploratory 
approach offers itself  when there are neither parameters to be measured through a controlled 
experiment nor an understanding of the conditions under which measurement might be 
meaningful.   
The testbed approach is very much engineering in the sense of the construction of a mechanism 
followed by a study of its operation in simple cases.  The purpose is to identify and correct 
sources of problems as guided by special case theory, principles and scaling up in terms of size 
and complexity. The data analysis rests on seeking the answers to two questions: (i) does the 
mechanism do what it is supposed to do and (ii) does it do it for understandable reason, i.e. the 
behavioral principles used in the design process. 
The testbed experiments reported here incorporate lumpy supply primarily caused by different 
sized vehicles as dictated by potential suppliers from the local transportation industry.  
Coordination problems are caused by student locations and time/distance constraints on routes.  
The mechanism is two sided but the buyers submit fixed bids for rides reflecting the fact that the 
first pilot test would have the government bidding for students by placing a fixed, private bid for 
a ride.
3
 The environment is such that the equilibria of standard models, like the competitive 
model, do not exist.  Consequently, the efficiency of a decentralized competitive process is not 
guaranteed.  
While there is no complete theory that might support an appropriate mechanism, a body of 
principles have been successful under other circumstances and can be applied to guide a step by 
step process of mechanism construction.  The broad principles are the tools that carry the results 
of controlled experiments to the more complex and untested field pilot.  The experiments focus 
on the reliability of those principles for supporting a design and on their robustness to remain 
reliable within broad and complex environments. 
 
                                               
3
 The policy preferred by the government is a fixed subsidy grant to families with disabled children but the size of 
the grants and other administrative controls (reflecting anticipations of moral hazard problems) are under 
development.  Similarly, the testbed is restricted to only a ride and does not include other features such as 
wheelchairs, supervision in transit, special medical equipment, home pickup, time of day options, etc.  
Computational complexity, speed of auction, bidding processes and other challenges can be added once the basic 
issues are resolved.  
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 2.2 Research Questions. 
Evaluation rests on the answers to two questions
4
: 
1. In the testbed environment does the mechanism do what it was designed to do? 
2. Does it do what it does for understandable reasons?  Can we use the principles used in the 
design to explain behavior observed in the testbed?  
 
SECTION 3. Mechanism   
 
3.1 Overview.  
The mechanism is an iterating (continuous) “assignment” or “matching” system with “side 
payments” in which direct transactions between buyers and sellers do not take place.  In fact, 
buyers are not buying exactly what the sellers sell and instead are buying “features” of what the 
sellers provide.  A buyer pays for an assignment to a ride on a properly equipped vehicle that 
will pick up and deliver the buyer at a location of choice.  Sellers make variously equipped 
vehicles available for a price regardless of the number of passengers that happened to be 
transported on the vehicle. That is, if the seller's vehicle is used at all then the seller receives the 
entire asking price and if the vehicle is not used then the seller receives nothing. Thus, prices are 
non-linear.  Bids are made and adjusted in light of other bids.  When the mechanism stops, the 
money passes through the mechanism - from the rider to the mechanism and then from the 
mechanism to the transportation supplier - which makes a profit and pays for resource use.    
Whether or not a potential rider is assigned to a vehicle depends upon features required in a bid, 
the amount of the rider’s bid, the bids of others, the location of the bidder and the amount vehicle 
suppliers ask for the use of their vehicles. Whether or not a vehicle supplier’s vehicle is used or 
not also depends on the same class of variables. The mechanism considers all bids for rides, the 
locations of bidders and all asks for vehicles. Then it organizes transportation to maximize the 
cost/benefit notion of social welfare under the assumption that bids reflect marginal values and 
asks reflect marginal costs. 
The mechanism is two sided in which both buyers (passengers) and transportation suppliers 
(sellers) make offer decisions and the mechanism itself plays the role of a “middleman” that 
informs, coordinates and enforces the rules. The interpretations of bids and asks come from the 
foundations of cost benefit analysis. Bids are interpreted as an informed maximum willingness to 
pay and asks are interpreted as an informed minimum willingness to accept.  The difference 
                                               
4
 These questions were first introduced by Plott (1994) as a way to apply experimental methods to policy issues 
and answer questions that classical approaches to the use of experimental methods could not answer.  The 
questions are central to the methodology used in the testbed experiments and subsequent field application 
reported in Plott, Lee and Maron (2014). 
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between bids and asks is interpreted as gains from trade which the mechanism attempts to 
maximize minus a “mechanism surplus”, which is interpreted as a cost of social organization.  
The difference between the payments by the buyers and the receipts of the sellers represents a 
“mechanism” cost or “transactions” cost.  How this difference is interpreted can differ from 
application to application and according to the ultimate use of the funds.  We use different 
measures of efficiency as part of measuring mechanism success. 
In several respects the mechanism is similar to an electronic broker that puts sets of buyers 
together with sets of sellers. Sellers are paid what they ask and buyers pay what they bid and 
receive the service requested in the bid.  The difference between what buyers pay and what the 
sellers receive remains with the broker.  However, the built-in objectives and incentives used to 
guide mechanism decisions systematically differ from the incentives of brokers.  A broker takes 
action to maximize own profits. As shown in the Figures 1 and 2, (e.g. with limited competition 
and constant buy and sell prices) when the brokers keep the difference, they have an incentive to 
restrict transactions.  That is, brokers would have the incentive to restrict demand to keep cost of 
supply down and restrict supply to keep the prices up. By contrast the incentive of the 
mechanism is to maximize the gains from trade with no incentive to restrict trades at all. 
Figures 1 and 2 go about here 
The empirical questions turn on participant behaviors and the resulting system behavior. Will it 
operate to maximize gains from trade when participants are involved in a decentralized 
environment with no information about the preferences of others?  Will this performance depend 
on the environment? 
The formal structure of the general mechanism is similar to the classical general equilibrium 
system.  The system seeks to find an “assignment” for which the underlying system and resource 
constraints are satisfied. As the mechanism attempts to guide bids and asks to an assignment, it 
iterates as is illustrated in Figure 3. Buyers tender bids and sellers tender asks.  Winners are the 
agents who are part of the assignment as determined by the mechanism.  Buyers in the winning 
assignments pay the amount of their bid.  Sellers whose vehicle is part of a winning assignment 
are paid what they ask for the vehicle. 
Figure 3 goes about here. 
With each new bid or ask the system solves a maximization problem subject to the economic 
constraints dictated by the environment.  Specifically, the mechanism selects “provisionally” 
winning bidders and “provisionally” winning vehicles that become winners when the system 
terminates. Provisionally winning bidders are assigned to vehicles consistent with vehicle 
capacity and the vehicle routes that are consistent with assigned passenger locations.  Decisions 
depend on decentralized, strategic bidding behavior reflecting information feedback, beliefs 
about the decisions of others and related system behavior as it moves toward a theoretical 
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equilibrium.  If behaviors are not properly aligned with underlying incentives or if they are not 
properly coordinated, then system efficiency will suffer.  
Increment requirements and countdown clocks are used to guide the system to an equilibrium. 
Two countdown clocks provide incentives to submit timely bids and asks, as opposed to 
strategically waiting.  Each clock resets to a fixed (and public) time and counts down.  If either 
clock reaches zero, the mechanism ends and the provisional winners become winners. One of the 
clocks, a new bid clock, resets with each new bid or ask and then starts counting down again.  Its 
purpose is to encourage the timely arrival of new bids and the search for matches. However, 
because new offers need not result in new assignments, continuous strategic negotiations could 
keep the auction open with no actual changes in assignments.  In order to avoid such mechanism 
failures, the second clock, a new winner clock, resets with new assignments and then resumes a 
countdown.  Thus the new bid clock encourages bidding while the new winner clock puts 
pressure on achieving an assignment.  
3.2 The Formal Structure and Notation 
 A general model is outlined below. The experimental test is a much simplified and special case 
version but the general model is important for an understanding of the role played by the testbed 
in the context of the bigger problem. In essence the experimental testbed involves a reduction of 
the number of variables but the relationships in the model remain. The larger application will 
require more computational time and different screens for feedback and decisions. 
Italics means the variable is to be determined by program. 
Lowercase means that the variable takes on only 0 or 1 values. 
Bracket means a matrix. 
The non-italic means parameter or set.  
 
n N = the set of students (student is location specific and only one student per location) 
jJ = the set of vehicles 
qQ = a quality or type of service 
t = a type or style of vehicle.  In this model “features” are a characteristic of the vehicle and 
possibly subject to control by the vehicle owner.  This issue is of concern in policy discussions 
and is included here to illustrate how it is consistent with the model.  
Sj = capacity of vehicle j 
Jr = the set of vehicles owned by vehicle owner r 
Rt  Jr = a subset of vehicles offered by owner r that are a reconfiguration of a particular style of 
vehicle called type t. 
m M = {1,3,....M} = the set of all routes dictated by the set of students to be picked up by a 
specific vehicle.  These are determined independent of the program and implemented as simply a 
subset of the logical possibilities.  
Lim = 1 if child i is on route m and 0 otherwise 
dm = distance associated with route m. It can be in terms of miles, cost or time. 
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Qqj = 1 if service q is available on vehicle j and 0 otherwise.  
Bnj = the bid by student located at i for vehicle j. n N, jJ, Different vehicles can have 
difference in quality as well as services. The qualities are known to the bidder so the bid itself 
reflects the value the bidder places on the bundle of services associated with different vehicles. 
Pj  = the ask placed by the vehicle owner for supplying vehicle j; jJ 
 (Note that costs associated with route distance are paid according to the assigned cost of the 
route.) 
 
 
VARIABLES: these are determined as a solution to the program. 
Assignments: 
Aj =n xnj = number of students assigned to vehicle j 
Tj  = transportation cost associated with route assigned to vehicle j,  jJ  
The transportation cost can be subtracted from the objective function.  The potential routes can 
also be screened for cost or time and allowed only if below some threshold.   
k = multiplier on constraint k 
 
[Bjn]  Bjn  = bids placed on vehicles j by student n  
 
wj = 1 if the ask for vehicle j is accepted (vehicle j used) and 0 otherwise (vehicle j not used) 
 
[Lmn]  𝐿𝑚𝑛 = {1 if route m does pick up student n
0 if route m does not pick up student n
 
 
[zjn]  𝑧𝑗𝑛 = {1 if bid on vehicle 𝑗 placed by 𝑛 is winning
0 if bid on vehicle 𝑗 placed by n is not winning
 
 
[xnj]  𝑥nj = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛 𝑖𝑠  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑗
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑗
  
 
[ 𝑣𝑗𝑚]  𝑣jm = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑗
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑗
 
 
Maximize (objective function) 
 ∑ ∑ B𝑗𝑛𝑧𝑗𝑛
N
𝑛 − ∑𝑗P𝑗 𝑤𝑗
J
𝑗     Sum of benefits minus sum of costs 
     z, A, w, x, v,  
 
subject to constraints: 
(1)  ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑗 − 𝐴𝑗 = 0  ,
N
𝑛
 𝑗 ∈ J  
{definition of 𝐴𝑗 as the number of students assigned to j} 
 
(2) 𝐴𝑗 − 𝑆𝑗 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 0 
{vehicle passengers assigned to vehicle are limited to capacity if vehicle is selected and 0 if not} 
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(3)  [𝑥𝑛𝑗] 1⃗ 1𝑥𝐽  - 1⃗ 1𝑥𝐽  ≤  0    𝑜𝑟  ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑗 −  1 ≤  0 , 𝑛 
J
𝑗=0
∈ N   
{each passenger is assigned to no more than one vehicle} 
 
 
(4)  [B𝑗𝑛] = [𝑄𝑗𝑞] [𝑈𝑞𝑛]. 
{bids on vehicles are deduced from vehicle qualities and utilities placed on qualities} This step is 
included as an illustration of possible modification but was not used in the experiments because 
in the experiments the only feature of value to buyers was a ride. Instead, it is replaced by direct 
entry of the matrix B 
 
 
r = vehicle owner, Jr is the set of vehicles owned by r;   Jr   J,  ∪Jr = J, ,  Jr ∩ Jr’  =  
 
(5)  ∑ 𝑤𝑗∈𝐽𝑟 𝑗- 1 ≤ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟 
 
No owner has more than one vehicle chosen 
[𝑤𝑗∈𝐽𝑟] 1⃗ 𝐽𝑟𝑥1  - 1 ≤0 
In the testing constraints (4) and (5) were relaxed. (4) was relaxed because vehicles had only one 
feature (the ride), aside from timing and routing. (5) was relaxed because suppliers were willing 
to operate as many vehicles as might become winners. 
 
(6)   [ 𝑣𝑗𝑚] 1⃗ 𝐽𝑥1= 𝑤𝑗 in summation notion it is (𝑤𝑗 = ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 )  
 
[
𝑣𝑗1 ⋯ 𝑣1𝑀
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑣𝑗1 ⋯ 𝑣𝐽𝑀
] 
[
 
 
 
 
1
1
.
.
1]
 
 
 
 
   =   [
𝑤1
⋮
𝑤𝐽
] 
Equation (6) requires that a vehicle is assigned to only one route. 
 
 
(7) [𝑣𝑗𝑚] [𝐿𝑚𝑛] = [𝑧𝑗𝑛 ]   
 
[
𝑣11, … , 𝑣1𝑀
⋮ . . ⋮
𝑣𝐽1, … , 𝑣𝐽𝑀
] [
𝐿11, … , 𝐿1𝑁
⋮ . . ⋮
𝐿𝑀1, … , 𝐿𝑀𝑁
] = [
∑ 𝑣1𝑚 𝐿𝑚1,
𝑀
𝑚 … , ∑ 𝑣1𝑚𝐿𝑚𝑁
𝑀
𝑚
. . . . . .
∑ 𝑣𝐽𝑀 𝐿𝑚1,
𝑀
𝑚 … , ∑ 𝑣𝐽𝑚𝐿𝑚𝑁
𝑀
𝑚
] =   [𝑧𝑗𝑛 ] 
 
 
The matrix on the left contains the number of ways that routes can be assigned to vehicle j and 
used to pick up student n. 
 
  [ ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑚
𝑀  
𝑚 𝐿𝑚𝑛 ]J x N  = 𝑧𝑗𝑛 = {1  𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒  𝑗 𝑏𝑦  𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑛
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑗 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛
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The equation says that the expression is 1 for the pairs {j, n} for which the bid by n for vehicle j 
is winning and 0 for all others.  Students are assigned to vehicles that are assigned routes where 
the student is picked up. 
 
(8) [𝑣𝑗𝑚] [𝑑𝑚] = 𝑇(𝐽𝑥1) , that is  𝑇𝑗  = ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑚 𝑑𝑚
𝑀
𝐽=1  when stated as a summation.  
 
(9) 𝐼 (1xJ)  TJx1  = Total Transport cost =∑ 𝑇𝑗
𝐽
1  
   
Constraints (8) and (9) were replaced by a route filter that guaranteed that no vehicle is assigned 
a route that required over G minutes. 
 
SECTION 4. Testbed Environment 
Major economic parameters of the testbed are motivated by the pilot experiment environment 
including properties of the school, the number of students, student locations, equipment 
capacities of firms from the local transportation industry and policies, not all of which are 
known.  Because the exact parameters are not known the testbed implements (economic) 
problems that are a bit “harder” than those anticipated. 
4.1 Design and Procedures 
The mechanism testbed methods rest on classical procedures used in experimental economics.  
Demand and costs are induced with money according to parameters known to the experimenter 
but are not known to the mechanism.  Potential riders are given induced values for rides and 
features. Potential suppliers are given induced cost of vehicle operations. Participants acquire 
benefits through the coordination of decisions of buyers, the decisions of sellers and are 
measured by the flow of money that originates from buyers and ends up in the hands of sellers 
who cover cost. Mechanism success is measured by the net money payments to subjects relative 
to the maximum possible.  Thus, system efficiency reflects the traditional tool of experimental 
economics (Plott and Smith, 1978.) as the total of gains from trade divided by the maximum 
possible given the imposed economic parameters.  However, the mechanism under consideration 
is not a “market” reflecting negotiations between individual buyers and sellers typically tested 
through experimental economics.   
A total of five experimental sessions were conducted.  Each of the five sessions used four 
subjects who were undergraduate students at Caltech and had no experience in a similar type of 
experiment. Each of the five sessions contained four experimental series; Series A, Series B, 
Series C and Series D. Each of the four series tested the mechanism under a different set of 
parameters.  Thus the data set was produced through five sessions with four students each 
(twenty different subjects).  Subjects in a session participated in all four different series of the 
session and made multiple decisions within each series. For each subject the experiment 
produced four final outcome decisions, one from each series.  Each final outcome decision 
consisted of decisions regarding individual vehicles plus many other decisions as the mechanism 
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converged over time.  Each session lasted about two hours including a training period, the data 
from which were discarded.  Subjects earned an average of $45 each.
5
 
4.2 Incorporated Field Conditions 
   
The four experimental series, Series A, B, C and D, incorporate prominent features of the 
anticipated field trial where the conditions for equilibrium of classical models need not exist.  
Anticipated parameters were used because the exact conditions of the field trial will not be 
known until shortly before or even after the actual event.  
 
Basically, key parameters were approximately half of those anticipated in the field trial.
6
    
(i) Thirty two children are located at six pickup stops with group sizes (4,4,4,4,8,8).
7
  
(ii) The children along the school route selected for the initial trial were reasonably self-
sufficient, able to travel without specialized supervision and needed no special equipment such 
as a wheelchair.   
(iii) No vehicle can make over four stops.
8
  
(iv) Vehicle capacities are “cabs” ( 2 passengers) , ‘mini bus” (5 passengers) and “bus” (12 
passengers).
9
  
(v) Four suppliers expressed an interest in participating in the field trial.  Two specialize in small 
vehicles and two have access to large vehicles.  All have limited access to the mid capacity 
vehicles.  
(vi) Induced costs are in the range reflecting industry judgments and induced with considerable 
variability within a supplier. 
 
                                               
5
 Instructions were given with a power point that subjects could study on their computer.  They were also given a 
hard copy. The power point explained the mechanism operations and how subjects could make money.  The 
experiment proceeded as a sequence of independent periods and subjects were paid the full amount earned each 
period. Payoff charts were distributed before each period. 
       The environment was explained as a transportation exercise in which they had vehicles that they could offer for 
use. The particular use of their vehicle would be determined by the mechanism and if the vehicle was not used no 
additional cost would be incurred. If their vehicle was used, they would be paid the amount they asked independent 
of the route to which the vehicle was applied or the number of passengers on the vehicle.   
      The instructions concluded with an exercise using their first period incentives but without money. As part of the 
instructions subjects were instructed to make many bids and offers just to learn functionality and to do so without 
regard to profits.  However, after the instruction exercise they were required to calculate their hypothetical profits in 
order to demonstrate that they understood the incentives. 
 
6
 In order to manage the testbed experiment, the environment was scaled down by half.  Once performance, 
including software, computation speed, effectiveness of rules, behavior and instructions were established as 
satisfactory the plan called for a small number of exercises at larger scale.   
7
 The anticipated number of children is between 48 and 52.  The actual number of stops in the trial will be six. 
8
 The limitation on number of stops translates into a constraint that time in transit would be less than 25 minutes. By 
contrast the single bus used under the current policy when making all of the stops requires about an hour and a half 
one way.   
9
 These capacities are roughly half of the capacities of vehicles that the local transportation industry anticipates 
using. 
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4.3 Field Conditions Implementations: 
4.3.1 Demand. 
Policy considerations for the field trial reflect major simplifications of the demand side decisions 
relative to the most complex conditions that could be imagined. Rather than the families placing 
bids during an initial trial the government plans to place a fixed bid equal to allocated 
transportation funding.  The system would operate to minimize cost and the government would 
pay the bid of accepted suppliers. Thus, the testbed abstracted from strategic behavior of buyers.  
The initial field trial will apply to approximately 50 children.  Initial experiments scale the 
number down to 32 for testing with a few sessions planned at full scale. In terms of initial testing 
parameters the market demand is for 32 units at a price of 1000 francs per child.  These demand 
prices are unknown at the time of testing and were set high relative to expectations in order to 
challenge the efficiency properties of the mechanism.  However, a maximum bid of 200 francs 
per seat was implemented to reduce the time required for price convergence. 
4.3.2 Supply. 
The unit of analysis is a vehicle. The costs are assigned to vehicles and differ across vehicle 
capacities and across owners.  It is as though the owners own different models, have different 
maintenance policies and different drivers, all of which lead to different cost across owners for a 
vehicle with a fixed capacity.  Table 1 contains different concepts/models of firm costs for four 
different sets of cost parameters, Set A, Set B, Set C and Set D are used respectively in 
experimental Series A, B, C and D..    
Table 1 goes here 
Table 2 goes here 
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 go here 
The implied models of market supply for each of the four different sets are illustrated in Figures 
4, 5, 6 and 7.  The 32 passengers demand is a vertical line representing a perfectly inelastic 
demand (up to a price of 200 per seat).  Two different models of supply curves are used. One is 
based on accounting cost, vehicle cost per seat and the other model rests on the economic 
concept of efficient supply and cost per passenger.  The figures also contain different concepts of 
market equilibrium.  
For supply based on cost per seat (vehicle cost to the owner divided by vehicle seat capacity) the 
costs are different across vehicles.  Only the vehicle cost to the owner and its capacity are 
considered here.  The figures have supply arrayed by cost per seat from low to high. The 
capacity 12 vehicles are represented in a different color (shade) so the consequences of the 
“lumpy supply” can be assessed in the context of a supply function resting on accounting cost. 
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In addition to supply cost defined in the accounting terms of cost “per seat”, the cost can also be 
defined as “per passenger” and the vehicles ordered in terms of cost per passenger reflecting 
market efficiency based on the value placed on units by the buyers.  In Series A, the two 
concepts of cost are the same and supply is displayed as a single supply curve in Figure 4. Series 
A supply costs are the same at 32 units where the market demand cuts the market supply.  As 
will be emphasized when the discussion turns to models of market price, two concepts of 
marginal cost relative to market demand are important in the classical models of price 
determination. An internal marginal cost is well defined for units lower than 32 (the internal 
margin) and an external marginal cost is well defined for units greater than 32.  While the 
marginal costs will be important for price determination, there is no ambiguity about the vehicle 
since both margins apply to separate vehicles. 
The need to distinguish between per seat and per passenger cost (partial fill) and thus the need to 
distinguish between an accounting concept of supply and economically efficient supply becomes 
important if partially filled vehicles are part of an efficient supply.  The economically efficient 
supplies for the 32 units demanded are reported in Table 2 for all four sets of parameters. Notice 
that the efficient supply for Sets C and D has the market supply of seats at 33 seats rather than 
the 32 required to carry the seats demanded.  That is, excess capacity is part of an equilibrium. 
The competing concepts of supply are illustrated in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 for four sets of 
parameters.  The model that supports this computation is contained in the next section. 
For the parameter Set B in Figure 5, supply of 32 seats requires 8 seats of a 12 seat capacity 
vehicle that costs 1188 or 99 per seat.  If the vehicle is used it will have only eight passengers at 
a cost of 148.5 per passenger.  A distinction between per seat (99 per seat) and per passenger 
(148.5 per passenger) clearly makes a difference.  However, the least cost method of supplying 
32 passengers does not include the 12 seat capacity vehicle. The eight seats needed for 
passengers supplied by that 12 seat vehicle (cost = 1189) can be supplied by four two capacity 
vehicles at a lower cost of 810 (200+202+204+204 = 810) and an internal marginal cost (per 
passenger) of 102.  The efficient supply is shown as black circles in Figure 5.  
Classical economics holds that the relevant marginal cost is the efficient cost per passenger since 
the passenger is the source of social benefits and thus should be reflected in any price that has 
resource use implications.  Parameter sets C and D distinguish cases of partial fills and internal 
vs external margins.  Set C in Figure 6 has a focus on partial fills and an internal per passenger 
margin of 94 as compared with an external per passenger margin of 113.  Set D in Figure 7 also 
has partial fills with an efficient internal per passenger margin of 75 to be compared with the 
inefficient internal per passenger margin of 94. 
 
SECTION 5.  Models, Theory and Principles 
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The assessments of the laboratory experimental data focus directly on the two research questions 
introduced in Section 2 above.  The first question to be answered with experimental data is: 
“Does the mechanism do what it is designed to do?”  The mechanism is designed to produce an 
efficient allocation.  Consequently, measurements are focused on efficiency.  The second 
question is design consistency.  Are the principles used in the design of the mechanism those 
observed when the system is actually operating?  Are the observed operations of the process 
consistent with the theory that led to the design?   
Economic policy experimental testbeds involve questions that are not addressed adequately by 
traditional methodologies. The data analysis for testbed, laboratory experiments differs from 
standard theory testing or parameter measurement. 
 5.1 The Design Purpose - Efficiency.  
The purpose of the mechanism is to produce an economically efficient allocation of 
transportation resources. Given the parameters of the testbed environment, efficient allocations 
do exist so efficiency is not inconsistent with the logic of the tests. Full efficiency is possible and 
the efficient allocations are contained in Table 2 in the previous section for each of the series A-
D.  If, for example, the bids for transportation are perfectly revealing of preferences and if the 
costs are revealed in the bids of transportation suppliers then the outcome of the assignments 
constructed by the mechanism will be efficient.  Whether or not the mechanism operates 
efficiently, the purpose of the design, is an empirical question. Efficiency in operation follows 
from no general principles. Many equilibria can exist and while some are efficient, others are 
not. 
5.2 Design Consistency. 
The second question is “Does the mechanism do what it does for understandable reasons?”  The 
question puts the focus on the principles used to construct the mechanism. The principles used in 
the analysis are the “understandable reasons” that support predictions of when the mechanism 
will work and when it will not work.  If the mechanism performance is accidental, then there are 
no compelling reasons to expect the performance to replicate or be successful under slightly 
different field conditions. Thus, the design rests on a presumption that if the principles operate 
then efficient outcomes are to be expected and cannot be attributed to some random events.  
Furthermore, a presumption exists that the mechanism will work in other environments where 
the principles apply even though no experiments of the alternative environments are studied. In 
essence the theory provides the foundation for expectations of performance robustness, which 
some call “ecological” or “external validity”. 
Three basic behavioral principles are known to operate under a broad set of circumstances and 
thus might be expected to guide systems behavior.  
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1. Bids tend to be best responses or in the direction of best responses to the bids of others.
10
 
2. Mechanisms equilibrate
11
. 
3. The equilibration is toward a Nash stable assignment.  That is, the allocations at the 
equilibrium are supported as Nash response strategies.  No agent has a decision option that 
makes the agent better off given the decisions of others. 
In the testbed environment the classical competitive model can be used to answer neither of the 
motivating questions. The student transport problem has features that are compatible with the 
competitive model. However, the environment also contains cases that are incompatible with 
competitive oriented models and collectively suggest classical forms of market organization 
cannot be successfully applied to produce efficient allocations.  The parameters in Set A can 
support a “one price” equilibrium (see Figure 4) and Set B can also support a one-price 
equilibrium if the price is measured in terms of “per passenger”.  However, Figures 5 through 7 
illustrate that the competitive (one price) equilibrium does not exist in Sets C and D. Hence, the 
question of existence and efficiency do not follow from the application of the competitive 
equilibrium model when applied to potentially real cases. 
Fortunately, the first principle, best response, does lead to a model that is well known in the 
literature.  The model does not lend itself to analytical techniques and computation of equilibria.  
However, simulation of the mechanism with robot agents following a best response bidding (best 
allowable price) dynamic provides surprising and useful insights for parameter sets A-D.
12
  In 
particular, the simulations when operating in the testbed environments result in convergence to 
the optimal (least cost) use of vehicles.  That is, in these environments the best response 
strategies lead to an efficient and stable match, as summarized in Proposition 1.  
                                               
10
 This form of behavior is well documented in games and in markets.   
11
  The mechanism is very similar to sincere or “straight forward” bidding in multiple item, ascending price auctions 
that are known to converge to predictable equilibria. These strategies do not anticipate the reactions of others. G. 
Demange, D.  Gale and M. Sotomayor (1986), “Multiple-Item Auctions.” The Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4): 
863-827.  
12
 Simulation results: each parameter set is run 3 times. Because the sequence of order submission, the final results 
are different, with set D being most significant. Also, the bidding is done based on current state. Since each seller 
bids independently, it is possible the state has changed when the bid is submitted.  
1. Each seller checks the current state, skipping currently leading vehicle offers. 
2. For non-leading offers, if the next allowable price does not make it leading, the potential profit is calculated with: 
NextPrice - Cost. If the NextPrice will become leading, it computes the potential profit: NextPrice - Cost - 
bumped_leading_offers_profit + brought_in_offers_profit.  
3. It then select the highest potential profit vehicle and submit the offer. If submitting an offer will cause the current 
total profit to decrease, then no offer is submitted.  
4. wait 5 seconds and repeat from step 1. When no seller can submit a more profitable offer, the bidding stops and 
clock runs down, and market closes.  
Parameters: increment is 5 
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Proposition 1.  When supply agents use a best response strategy with any of the parameters Set 
A, Set B, Set C and Set D the auction (i) converges to an efficient (least cost) allocation and (ii) 
the resulting allocation is a stable match. 
Support.  (i) The numerical simulations of the mechanism contained in Table 3 demonstrate that 
when all agents follow a best response strategy the mechanism terminates at an efficient supply.  
In all but 2 of the 12 simulations the results are efficient supply. The discrepancies from the 
efficient supply in the two exceptions are less than 5%, the increment requirement. 
(ii) Stability follows from the fact that the allocation is supported by (derived from) a best 
response strategy.  Given the bids of others, no agent has an incentive to deviate - bid more or 
less than the agent’s current bid. 
Table 3 goes here 
While proposition 1 establishes the theoretical foundation for an expectation that the mechanism 
will result in an efficient and stable match. As will be addressed in the next sections the classical 
competitive models do not provide such support. However, stable assignments or matches can 
exist when the competitive equilibria do not exist.  The stable outcomes have been shown to 
emerge in markets where the competitive equilibria do not exist.
13
  Furthermore, inefficient, 
stable matches exist in the testbed environments
14
 while equilibria of the classical models do not. 
The empirical issues are whether the principles are at work and bring the mechanism to an 
equilibrium, stable assignment and whether or not the equilibrium is efficient. 
SECTION 6. Results  
 
The results address the fundamental questions regarding the mechanism and the proof of 
concept. Does the mechanism do what it was designed to do and is the performance consistent 
with the (well established) principles that led to its construction?  The basic result outlined below 
is that the mechanism does do what it was designed to do. Furthermore, because it does it for the 
right reasons an expectation exists that it will also work in the field trial. The analysis led to 
additional results regarding price formation and supports an understanding of supplier revenues 
and distributions of costs. 
                                               
13
 Hatfield, Plott and Tanaka(2016) demonstrate the emergence of stable matches in cases in which the existence of 
the competitive equilibrium was destroyed by the imposition of price ceilings and price floors. Herings (2015) 
brings HPT closer to a theory of markets by demonstrating that the stable matches can be supported by fixed price 
equilibria (Dreze, 1975,),(Drez and Miller, 1980).  That line of theory suggests that a properly structured mechanism 
can lead to the “discovery” of the fixed price equilibria. 
14
 In the environments studied here not all stable assignments are efficient. Consider, for example Set D and suppose 
the three capacity 12 vehicles bid 106 and that all other vehicles bid 110.  The three capacity 12 vehicles are 
profitable and none of the thee has an incentive to undercut.  All get what they ask (e.g. cost or a little above) and do 
not care if they have passengers or not.  Among the non-winners there are two 2’s and a 5 that should be in the 
efficient set and are not.  The allocation is inefficient.  However, none of the small vehicles can make a 
profitable bid that will make them a winner.  They can make coordinated bids but those are not Nash responses and 
thus the match is stable.  This example leads to insights about why the mechanism does not get stuck here. 
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The first result addresses the efficiency of the allocations. Efficiency is defined by consumer 
surplus divided by maximum possible consumer surplus. However, in this testbed the focus was 
on cost minimization.  The buyers were simply bids placed by the experimenter so the demand 
price has little meaning in terms of social welfare. The value of units sold is a constant K= [32 V 
where V = 200].  Efficiency becomes:  
[(K- total cost of units sold)/(K- minimum cost of producing 32)]. 
The minimum cost of 32 units is the cost of the optimal supply. Efficiency equals 1 if and only if 
total cost of units sold = cost of optimal.  As at least 32 units are produced and sold, efficiency 
varies directly with the cost of goods sold.  Thus, cost of goods sold/optimal cost becomes a 
proxy for efficiency and is also a measure of “production efficiency” in the sense of the waste 
resulting from using an inefficient method of production. Partial vehicle fills means that the 
marginal cost of an additional passenger is zero and exhibits the tension with the competitive 
model caused by the non-convexities. 
 
Result 1. Mechanism outcomes include partial fills of vehicles and are near 100% efficiency.  
 
Support. The efficient allocation in sets B, C, and D involve partial fills so the efficient 
allocation for those parameter sets demonstrates the ability of the mechanism to efficiently 
include partial fills (zero marginal cost for a passenger).  The efficiency results of all 
experimental sessions are in Table 4. The mechanism operates at near 100% efficiency. 20 
experimental sessions were performed and 12 exhibited a 100% efficiency level.  Only one had 
an efficiency loss of over 5%, higher than the incremental requirement. 
 
Table 4 goes here 
 
The second result is focused on stability in the sense of best responses. While the concept of 
stability follows from efficiency of the outcome, the property could be a consequence of a wide 
variety of strategies.  The next proposition characterizes the decisions that lead to equilibrium 
and match stability if best response strategies are used by all agents. 
Result 2. Outcomes are stable matches 
Support. Consider the 20 experiments. A “period” constitutes an experiment. There are 4 periods 
each day and 5 days. There are four subjects in each experiment so we have 20 x 4 = 80 end of 
period individual outcomes that we examine for stability. The condition of stability reflects both 
structural and informational factors.   
A decision is considered to be stable given the decisions of others, when there does not exist an 
action that (i) produces profits greater than a small transaction cost
15
 of 10 francs; (ii) is 
                                               
15
 In this case a transaction cost of 10 francs is assumed.  A transactions costs is a well-established feature of 
individual preferences.  Individual will not take an action without a small benefit.  The use of a “trading 
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“informed rational” in the sense that individual decisions reflect the opportunity cost of bids on 
vehicles that replace their own winning bids on other vehicles
16
 and; (iii) is recognized by the 
bidder as feasible in the sense that during the auction the individual made at least one bid on the 
vehicle.
17
 Of the 80 individual outcomes, 23 have actions that would produce a non-zero profit 
but only 14 of those actions would produce profits over 10 francs and 4 of those 14 are not 
recognized by the bidder as feasible.  Thus 70 of the 80 outcomes are stable.  The pattern 
demonstrates that property of stability is not due to some purely random event.
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A model of price determination follows directly from efficiency and the best response models.  
The general lack of existence of competitive equilibria in the economic environments due to the 
non-convexities suggests that the pricing will not be consistent with the one price model. 
However, the non-convexities of the economic environments together with the efficiency seeking 
properties of the mechanism lead to a need for bidders to “fit together”.  That, in turn, suggests a 
concept of “types” that pits bidders of a similar capacity type against each other in a competition 
for a “slot” in the set of winners.  
According to the best response model, bidders will submit bids above cost but just sufficiently 
low to make a contract match while preventing having the contract being replaced in a match by 
a competitor. The implication is that prices are set by the cost of the “external margin” bidder of 
a capacity type.  The result is that the prices are structured as a form of “entry preventing” price.  
Given a theoretically efficient allocation, the excluded bidder of a given capacity type with the 
lowest cost per seat from among the excluded bidders of that type will be the price per seat 
charged by the winning bidders of that type. We call this price the “entry preventing price for a 
(capacity) type”. However, it could be a collection of vehicles with the same collective capacity. 
The entry preventing price for a capacity type is the minimum cost per seat of the excluded 
bidders of a capacity type.  In a stable assignment, the winning bidders constitute the most 
economically efficient supply.  The best response principle indicates that the excluded bidders of 
a given type will probe the market with bids near the cost per seat times the number of seats.  
The ultimate winner would respond with lower bids until the competition no longer exists.  This 
feature of theory together with the continuous nature of the mechanism bidding process provides 
the foundation for an empirical test summarized by the third result. 
                                                                                                                                                       
commission” or its equivalent is a universally used feature of economics experiments that is either added to 
models or added to payoffs (Plott and Smith, 1978). 
16
 This level of rationality is natural because the mechanism reveals when a bid on one vehicle will remove winning 
bids on one or more of their other vehicles.  For example, a low bid on a vehicle with a 12 seat capacity could 
replace winning bids of own smaller capacity vehicles. 
17
 Sometime options in complex systems simply go unnoticed or for some reason the bidder thinks that it cannot 
be profitable. The consequence is that bids are not made on the option.  It is as if the option does not exist. 
18
 We consider the final outcome of each experiment and determine if the outcome meets the conditions sufficient 
for the outcome to be stable and if they are met the outcome is classified as stable. The hypothesis that stability is 
a random event with stability occurring with a probability of 50% or less can be rejected. 
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The third result demonstrates that the principles used to support the mechanism design explain 
the prices that evolve through the application of the mechanism in the testbed environment. 
Result 3. Prices differ across capacity types and are determined by the entry preventing price for 
the type.  
Support.  The analysis proceeds in two steps.  First, for each type and for each experiment, the 
per seat cost of the excluded bidders, those not part of the efficient allocation, are computed.  
The cost per seat by parameter set and capacity type are contained in Table 1. 
Table 5 goes here: 
The data in Table 5 provides a strong impression of the relationship between winning bids of a 
(capacity) type and the cost of excluded bidders of the same type. A simple regression is 
formulated as: 
  Price of winning bidder of type= a + b (price per seat of excluded bidder of type) 
The model is then applied to each of the parameter sets and experiments. The regression results 
for the pooled data are in Figure 8.  The coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 1 and 
the intercept is indistinguishable from zero.  
 Figure 8 goes here 
 
SECTION 7.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The project explored the properties of a mechanism designed as a tool for procuring human 
services in economic environments that can lead to the failure of markets organized along 
classical lines.  The research purposes and the environments were taken from a field context 
where the mechanism will be implemented should success be suggested by testbed results.  The 
focus is on the “supply side” of a problem in which a diverse set of suppliers compete for the 
demand as expressed by the government.  Thus, the competition is “one sided” as opposed to two 
sided in which the ultimate users of the services, in our case the families of the children who will 
be using the transportation services, express willingness to pay.  
The supply problem is complex.  Non-convexities are pronounced.  Information is private.  
Coordination among suppliers is part of the problem.  The “lumpy” supply creates a situation 
where vehicles are only partially filled and thus exhibit zero marginal cost for an additional rider. 
The supply involves coordination among the sellers among stops and routes taken by vehicles.  
The complex environments are explored extensively as is a case where the data should be 
predicted by the competitive model.  Specifically, the competitive equilibrium, the one price 
equilibrium, exists in only one of the settings.   
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The mechanism is novel.  It does not exist in the field or in abstract theory. It is not supported by 
a unified theory and it does not rest on principles used in traditional mechanism design research 
and applications.  The experimental methods differ from textbook methods. However, the 
mechanism was constructed from principles found useful in other complex environments, 
previous experimental work and from mechanism adjustments in the light of experimental 
performance.  Elements of classical procedures and theories do play a systematic role. 
The testbed methodology addresses two questions.  1. Does the mechanism do what it is 
supposed to do?  2. Does it do what it does for understandable reasons, i.e. the principles used in 
the mechanism construction?  The first question is a form of proof of principle or proof of 
concept.  It asks if the mechanism performs as desired in experimental environments with 
economic challenges similar to those expected in the potential application.  The second question 
addresses the robustness needed for successful application.  Is success due to the systematic 
operation of principles as opposed to a lucky accident?  The mechanism will be functioning in an 
environment that will differ from the testbed environment. The question is whether or not theory 
used in the design process is robust in the presence of small change in parameters.  Expectations 
of success are supported by the wide range of experiments in which the principles are central 
parts of models that work satisfactorily.  
Proof of concept was established in the testbed environment. The mechanism does what is 
supposed to do by achieving near 100% efficiency in all testing environments.  The demand was 
always satisfied by the least cost allocation.  
The mechanism follows well established principles.  The dynamic process followed a best 
response model often found in well performing auctions.  Coordination and fitting was done by a 
computerized process in which bidders were pitted against similarly equipped suppliers with 
assignment determined by lowest bid.  The process was fast with successful suppliers changing 
every few seconds until the process converged to equilibrium. Pricing was dictated by the 
excluded bidders of similar type.  Thus, the most efficient supplier occupied the niche and 
received a price approximated by the cost of the lowest cost excluded bidder of the same type.  
Simply put, the mechanism “discovers” both the most efficient allocation and the prices that 
support (maintain) that allocation as equilibrium.  Remarkably, the mechanism produces the 
efficient allocation and prices that maintain the allocation (support the allocation) and thus does 
so without information about costs. Such results are similar to what the Dreze (1975) fixed price 
equilibrium and the generalizations by Herings (2015) seek to do through administrative 
procedures. 
The results of the testbed appear to justify a field trial. The mechanism is understandable in 
terms of basic economic principles.  A wide range of sellers can compete. Coordination over 
routes is automatically solved and sellers are paid an additional predetermined transportation cost 
for assigned routes. The structure guarantees that it will not operate at a loss and any surplus is 
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paid to the school or some other entity. The mechanism is simple from a user point of view. 
Winning buyers pay their bid price. Winning sellers pay their asking price. Users are not exposed 
to the possibility of loss. Thus success is not simply an accident and a presumption exists that it 
will work under multiple different field conditions. This testbed result justifies taking the 
mechanism to a field test. 
 
REFERENCES 
Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, M. (1986). Multi-item auctions. Journal of Political 
Economy, 94(4), 863-872. 
Dreze, J. H. (1975). Existence of an exchange equilibrium under price rigidities. International 
Economic Review, 16(2), 301-320. 
Dreze, J. H., & Müller, H. (1980). Optimality properties of rationing schemes. Journal of 
economic theory, 23(2), 131-149. 
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The 
American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9-15. 
Hatfield, J. W., Plott, C. R., & Tanaka, T. (2016). Price controls, non-price quality competition, 
and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 134-163 
Herings, P. (2015). Equilibrium and matching under price controls. 
Herings, P. J. J., & Konovalov, A. (2009). Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-
competitive. Journal of mathematical economics, 45(1), 43-58 
Plott, C. R. (1994). Designer Markets: Laboratory Experimental Methods in Economics: 
Symposium. 
Plott, Charles R., Hsing-Yang Lee, & Maron, T. (2014).  The Continuous Combinatorial Auction 
Architecture. American Economic Review, 104(5), 452-56. 
Plott, C. R., & Smith, V. L. (1978). An experimental examination of two exchange 
institutions. The Review of economic studies, 45(1), 133-153. 
Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. (1990). Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling 
and analysis, Cambridge University Press  
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
  
23 
 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1. System Surplus Under Transport Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. System Surplus Under a Broker Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Children Transport Mechanism Overview 
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Submit bids on vehicles with 
different features or 
services for the ride from 
home to school. 
System optimizes sum of “expressed benefits” 
minus sum of “expressed cost”: 
 vehicles used 
 vehicle feature configurations 
 payment to vehicle suppliers 
 assignment of passengers to vehicles that 
provide desired services  
 payments by passengers 
 assignment of routes to vehicles reflecting 
transportation cost or time constraints 
 mechanism “surplus” if one exists 
 
 
List the services that will 
be available on various. 
Submit asking price for the 
operation of various 
vehicles. 
 Different asking prices can 
be posted for different 
vehicles.  
 
Iterative 
bidding 
process 
used to 
shape, 
coordinate 
and select 
final bids.    
DEMAND SIDE OF SERVICES SUPPLY SIDE OF SERVICES   
25 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Parameter Set A: One Price Equilibria External Margin 50 and Internal Margin 38 
 
 
Figure 5. Parameter Set B: One Price Per Passenger Equilibria External Margin 102 and Internal 
Margin 99 and Partial Fill and thus Zero Marginal Cost for a Passenger 
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Figure 6: Parameter Set C: Equilibrium Price Per Passenger External Margin 111 and Internal 
Margin 95, Internal Marginal Cost per Seat 75 and Zero Marginal cost for a Passenger 
 
Figure 7: Parameter Set D: Equilibrium Price External Margin per Passenger 111, 
Internal Margin per Passenger 94; Internal Margin Cost per Seat 75 (Partial Fill thus Zero 
Marginal Cost for a Passenger). 
 
Figure 8: Prices by Type Determined by Lowest Cost Excluded Bidder of Type 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Price per seat 0.9896 0.0394 
Intercept 2.0744 3.6484 
R squared 0.833 
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Table 1:  Total Cost and Cost per Seat by Vehicle Size, Parameter Set and Experimental Session 
Set A  #311 
  
#312 
  
#313 
  
#314 
  
# seats VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat 
  2   cab 0 20 10 4 2 1 8 72 36 14 76 38 
  2   cab 1 112 56 5 68 34 9 106 53 15 100 50 
  2   cab 2 120 60 6 124 62 10 126 63   
 
  
  5   MB 3 185 37 7 260 52 11 175 35 16 290 58 
12   bus   
 
    
 
  12 648 54 17 372 31 
12   bus           13 660 55 18 684 57 
             Set B #311 
  
#312 
  
#313 
  
#314 
  
# seats VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat 
  2   cab 0 200 100 4 202 101 8 204 102 14 150 75 
  2   cab 1 240 120 5 244 122 9 248 124 15 204 102 
  2   cab 2 242 121 6 246 123 10 250 125   
 
  
  5   MB 3 420 84 7 430 86 11 575 115 16 600 120 
12   bus   
 
    
 
  12 1056 88 17 1188 99 
12   bus             13 1212 101 18 1200 100 
             Set C #311 
  
#312 
  
#313 
  
#314 
  
# seats VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat 
  2   cab 0 2 1 4 148 74 8 226 113 14 260 130 
  2   cab 1 244 122 5 224 112 9 252 126 15 262 131 
  2   cab 2 246 123 6 248 124 10 256 128   
 
  
  5   MB 3 555 111 7 375 75 11 570 114 16 560 112 
12   bus   
 
    
 
  12 816 68 17 780 65 
12   bus           13 1356 113 18 1344 112 
             Set D #311 
  
#312 
  
#313 
  
#314 
  
# seats VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/  
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat VID cost 
Cost/ 
seat 
  2   cab 0 144 72 4 148 74 8 226 113 14 260 130 
  2   cab 1 244 122 5 224 112 9 252 126 15 262 131 
  2   cab 2 246 123 6 248 124 10 256 128   
 
  
  5   MB 3 555 111 7 375 75 11 570 114 16 560 112 
12   bus   
 
    
 
  12 816 68 17 780 65 
12   bus           13 840 70 18 1344 112 
             
 
Table 2. Optimal Allocations by Parameter Set: A, B, C and D 
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Set A 
Optima
l         
Set 
B 
Optima
l       
PIC vid# 
Capacit
y cost 
CostP
S   PIC vid# 
Capacit
y cost 
CostP
S 
311 1 2 20 10   311 1 2 200 100 
313 12 5 175 35   313 13 12 
105
6 88 
314 15 2 76 38   314 15 2 150 75 
314 18 12 372 31   314 16 2 204 102 
311 4 5 185 37   311 4 5 420 84 
312 5 2 2 1   312 5 2 202 101 
312 6 2 68 34   312 8 5 430 86 
313 9 2 72 36   313 9 2 204 102 
                      
    
Total 
32  
Total 
970          
Total 
32 
Tota
l 
286
6   
 
 
Set C Optimal         Set D Optimal       
PIC vid# Capacity Cost CostPS   PIC vid# Capacity cost CostPS 
311 1 2 2 1   311 1 2 144 72 
313 13 12 816 68   313 13 12 816 68 
314 18 12 780 65   314 18 12 780 65 
312 5 2 148 74   312 5 2 148 74 
312 8 5 375 75   312 8 5 375 75 
                      
    
Total  
33 
Total 
2121         Total 33 
Total  
2263   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Numerical Simulations of Mechanism Outcomes Under the Assumption of Best Reply 
Behavior 
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Comparison of aggregate winner cost with efficient supply: 
three simulations of each parameter set 
 
Simulations Set A Simulations Set B Simulations Set C Simulations Set D 
 
#1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3 
Winner 
Cost 970 
100
2 970 
286
6 
286
6 2866 2121 
219
6 
212
1 
226
3 
226
3 2263 
Optimal 
Cost 970 970 970 
286
6 
286
6 2866 2121 
212
1 
212
1 
226
3 
226
3 2263 
             
error 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 0 
 
  
31 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Efficiency in Experimental Tests 
 
 
Supply Efficiency Loss = [cost of units delivered – minimum possible cost of 
delivering 32]/minimum possible 
Period 20170413 20170418 20170419 20170420 20170424 
1(practice) 0.00% 4.54% 15.15% 22.99% 39.59% 
2  Set A 0.00% 8.25% 0.00% 3.30% 0.00% 
3  Set B 0.00% 1.54% 1.54% 4.68% 0.00% 
4  Set C 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.68% 0.00% 
5 Set D 0.00% 0.00% 3.45% 4.95% 0.00% 
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Table 5. Bid Price of Excluded Bidder of a Type and Bid of Included Bidder; All Parameter Sets 
 
  
Type 
Capacity 
Excluded 
bidder price 
Average price 
of included 
bidders 
Set A 
2 50 52.5 
5 52 48.4 
12 54 51.1 
Set B 
2 120 114.3 
5 110 97 
12 99 99.9 
Set B 
2 112 113 
5 111 94.2 
12 112 100.9 
Set B 
2 112 116.2 
5 111 96.1 
12 70 95.2 
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